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IS SENTENCING REFORM  
A LOST CAUSE? 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN 
SENTENCING RESEARCH 
LESLIE SEBBA* 
For Nietzsche, we are more likely to engage in the development of “semiotic fictions” 
that provide us with an illusory state of understanding and mastery of the universe. He 
has emphasized that rather than search for the “truth” resting on Logos, the search for 
a seemingly underlying logic, rationality, and certainty, we should focus on Pathos—
struggle, contradiction, the unexpected, surprise, and the emergent.
1
 
I 
PROLOGUE: AN ANECDOTE 
After a period of studying and working in Israel in the early 1960s, I was 
employed as a Research Officer in the English Home Office Research Unit at a 
time when the British government was contemplating the adoption of the 
suspended sentence of imprisonment as a means for stemming the tide of an 
increasing prison population. Israel, which on gaining independence in 1948 had 
inherited a criminal justice system based on the English model, had introduced 
a similar reform a few years earlier. On the basis of a somewhat rudimentary 
examination of the statistical data on the sentencing practices of the Israeli 
courts (broken down by court level and type of offense) during the years prior 
to and following their reform, I reached the following conclusions: “The 
assumption that custodial rates would decrease was borne out. They were in 
fact reduced to less than half their previous level . . . . They were reduced in 
both district courts and magistrates’ courts, and for almost every category of 
offence.”2 
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Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 L.Q.R. 225 (2000). 
 1.  Dragan Milovanovic, Introduction, in CHAOS, CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW 
ORDERLY (DIS)ORDER, at viii (Dragan Milovanovic ed., 1997). 
 2.  Leslie Sebba, Penal Reform and Court Practice: The Case of the Suspended Sentence, in 
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The positive outcome of the Israeli reform might have been attenuated if 
large numbers of suspended sentences had subsequently been activated 
following the commission of a further offense during the suspension period. But 
activation rates did not prove to be high.3 On this occasion, in an apparent 
reversal of the usual pattern, Britain could learn from the Israeli experience. I 
therefore drafted a position paper for the Home Office extolling the potential 
of using suspended sentences to reduce imprisonment. While I have no 
knowledge of the weight, if any, given to my position paper in the formulation 
of the British government’s policy, the reform was incorporated in the 
subsequent legislation—the Criminal Justice Act of 1967.4 Its main purpose, 
more explicitly than in Israel, was to avoid using imprisonment.5 To ensure this 
would be the outcome rather than “net-widening” (whereby new softer 
sanctions serve as additions to the use of prison sentences rather than replacing 
them), a rule was introduced (first by the Court of Appeal, later by statute) to 
ensure that the suspended sentence would not serve as an alternative to non-
custodial penalties: 
[S]entencing courts must first consider and dismiss all non-custodial penalties (fine, 
probation, etc.) as inappropriate, then decide that a sentence of imprisonment had to 
be passed, fix the length of that sentence, and then and only then go on to ask whether 
the sentence of imprisonment could legitimately be suspended in the particular 
circumstances.
6
 
The outcome, however, was very different from that which was intended—
and indeed might have been anticipated on the basis of the Israeli experience. 
There was “extremely strong inferential evidence that after 1967 the courts at 
once used the suspended sentence not only in place of imprisonment, but also 
where they would previously have imposed the fine or probation.”7 Moreover, 
the English magistrates’ courts tended to impose longer terms than when 
imposing immediate imprisonment. Further, because the activation rates for 
breach of the conditions were high and the sentence for the new offense had to 
be served consecutively with the activated sentences, reduction in prison 
numbers was not achieved by the legislation.8 Although a detailed academic 
analysis of these developments notes that the precise effects of the legislation 
 
STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 133, 150 (Israel Drapkin ed., 1969). 
 3.  Id. at 150–51. 
 4.  Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 39–42 (Eng.). 
   5.   Cf. Anthony E. Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in England, 1967–78, 21 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2–4 (1981) (noting that some advocates of suspended sentences laid greater emphasis 
on the individual deterrent qualities of this sentence). 
 6.  Id. at 4. The rule was identified with the name of the Court of Appeal case in which the 
principle was declared—R v. O’Keefe, [1969] 2 Q.B. 29—and was later incorporated into the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1972, c. 71, § 11–14 (Eng.). 
 7.  Bottoms, supra note 5, at 5. 
 8.  Id. at 8. 
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are disputed,9 its author adopted an unequivocal heading for his discussion of 
these events: “The Failure of Legislative Intention.”10 
II 
INTRODUCTION 
The present article was intended as a review of the conceptual and 
methodological issues arising in the course of sentencing research, particularly 
in the context of the evaluation of sentencing reforms. One message that 
appeared to emerge from the literature was the one reflected in the preceding 
anecdote, pointing to the unanticipated outcomes of sentencing reform. 
However, this message must be qualified owing to the uncertainty as to when 
such “outcomes” can indeed be attributed to the reforms that preceded them, 
given the methodological difficulties in attributing causal connection. Hence the 
negative tone of the article’s title. 
The problematic nature of sentencing research seems inherent in the 
complexity of the sentencing process. Innumerable variables operating at both 
the micro and the macro levels may affect both the sentencing process and the 
outcomes of its reforms. Were there to be a metric on the complexity of social 
institutions, sentencing would surely attract a high score as one of the more 
complex, and thus difficult, to research. 
There is an element of paradox in this observation, since the sentencing 
decision is usually a rather brief event occurring within the framework of an 
apparently highly structured process that in turn is governed by a panoply of 
rules. Such a view of the sentencing process is, however, misleading. Sentencing 
is a process that operates on many levels. In the first place it is the symbolic 
process that gives expression to society’s ability to impose social order and 
restrain the deviant. Secondly (and in large measure following from the 
previous point), the imposition of punishment may also constitute, in a literal 
sense, a communication to the general public, thereby attracting media interest. 
Public attention may be enhanced by the frequently contested character of one 
or other of the three main parameters of the sentencing decision: (a) its 
declared objective (to deter, rehabilitate, et cetera), (b) the choice of penalty 
selected (prison, fine, et cetera), and most particularly (c) its level of severity. 
Thirdly and most practically, the sentencing decision (although generally 
short and formalized) can be considered the lynchpin of the criminal justice 
system connecting the punishment to the crime in both symbolic and practical 
senses. At the same time, and of greater significance in the present context, 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. Apparently, after a period of decline a revived form of the suspended sentence was 
introduced in England in 2003 but, once again, it was found that “sentencers . . . are not always using it 
for the intended purposes.” ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 304 (5th ed., 
2010). Canadian research, however, which identifies this form of sentence as “community custody 
sentence,” describes how Canada has successfully introduced such sentences for reducing prison 
figures. See JULIAN ROBERTS, THE VIRTUAL PRISON 17 (2004). 
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sentencing may be seen as the final result of a sometimes long-awaited outcome 
of a process, the components of which may be difficult to identify and thus also 
hard to research. While the sentence on a syllogistic Beccarian model11 should 
be a necessary product of the offense and the legal provision applicable to it, 
the sentencing literature draws attention to a wide array of variables potentially 
affecting the sentencing decision, including judicial precedents, the 
circumstances of the offense, the criminal antecedents of the offender, the 
offender’s personality, circumstances, and socio-demographic characteristics, 
the personality and socio-demographic characteristics of the judge, 
prosecutorial and defense arguments, plea bargains, pre-sentence inquiry 
reports, victim input and conduct, court culture, local opinion, public opinion, 
and the media. 
Identifying which among the preceding list of variables should be impacting 
the sentencing decision and what weight each should carry is frequently in issue. 
Views held as to the relevance and legitimacy of a particular variable will 
depend on the purposes of sentencing deemed just and desirable and on the 
way these purposes are seen to play out in individual cases. As will be 
elaborated below, variations in the legitimacy attributed to a variable—whether 
by the decision-maker or the critical researcher—will tend to reflect the 
sentencing paradigm or ideology to which they adhere. The confusion 
surrounding the issue of disparities (and the distinct but related concept of 
discrimination) derives from ideological and interpretational issues no less than 
from empirical ones. 
The multiplicity of variables potentially impacting the sentence decision 
(whether directly or indirectly) and the potential interactions between them, 
together with value-laden questions relating to the legitimacy of such variables 
in light of competing sentencing aims, undoubtedly contribute to a lack of 
uniformity in the findings of evaluative research in this area. In spite of brave 
attempts to research this area in Israel, an unequivocal answer could probably 
not be given to the question raised in a comment on the government’s proposed 
sentencing reform as to whether there was an empirical basis for the allegations 
of sentencing disparities.12 And if researching the variables impacting sentencing 
practice is problematic, the ability to evaluate the effects of penal reform in this 
area is even more so: changes over time have to be measured and their causes 
must be identified, which requires controlling for all the other potential factors 
referred to above. 
Moreover, where the object of consideration is sentencing reform (as 
opposed merely to sentencing patterns), account must be taken of the possibly 
diverse objectives of the reform, the dynamics of policymaking, and the 
 
 11.  See infra Part III. 
 12.  Anat Horovitz et al., Position Paper on the Proposal for Penal Law (Amendment 92—
Structuring Judicial Discretion in Sentencing), 5756-2006, at 2 (June 2006) (on file with author). For a 
similar theme in relation to the federal sentencing guidelines in the United States, see KATE STITH & 
JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 104–42 (1998). 
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relationship between the reform of the component of the criminal justice system 
on which the reform is focused (in the present context, the sentencing process) 
and the other components of this system, as well as wider aspects of the 
relationship between legal and social change.13 Such contextual issues will 
impact both the content of sentencing reforms and the manner of their 
implementation. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the methodological problems inherent 
in evaluating sentencing reforms are likely to be almost insuperable.14 To 
measure the impact of the variables referred to within the judicial process, and 
a fortiori of external institutions and underlying social processes (not to speak 
of the interaction between these two sets of variables), presents an 
overwhelming challenge. If evaluations of sentencing reforms give rise to 
inconsistent results, this may be attributable to the aforementioned problems—
thereby compounding the unpredictability of the effects of the reforms 
themselves. 
The development of criminology in general, and penology in particular, may 
be identified with the modernist project—or what David Garland has called 
“penal welfarism.”15 Nineteenth and twentieth century scholars of the positivist 
school were confident of their ability to progress consistently towards the goal 
of an enlightened and reforming penal system;16 and, as indicated above, the 
sentencing process is necessarily at the heart of this project. While reformist 
ideas have generally been in retreat—or at least on the defensive—in the last 
decades, the discourse of sentencing reform seems to be resilient. According to 
Garland, both these developments are consistent with “late modernity,” 
whereby comprehensive reintegrationist policies that characterized modernity 
are replaced by ad hoc law enforcement initiatives.17 
The purpose of this article is to consider the numerous constraints—and the 
resultant confusions—that constitute obstacles both to sentencing reform and 
sentencing research. Some of these constraints and confusions are embedded in 
the ambiguities of the concepts incorporated in the sentencing discourse, 
including commonly used terms such as “disparities” (and “legal” and 
“extralegal” variables), as well as fundamental penological concepts such as 
“desert” and “severity.” The meanings of some of these concepts may change as 
ideologies are replaced and new sentencing paradigms emerge, thereby 
 
 13.  ROGER COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 44–70 (2d ed., 1992). 
 14.  Cf. David Weisburd, Magic and Science in Multivariate Sentencing Models: Reflections on the 
Limits of Statistical Methods, 35 ISR. L. REV. 225, 226, 238 (2001). The theme of the article is that “the 
boundaries between science and magic are often blurred in sentencing research.”  The author states, 
“[I]n the end, the assumption of correct model specification challenges the validity of nearly every 
sentencing study.” 
 15.  DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE 231–64 (1985). 
 16.  Id.; DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND 
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 294–95 (1971). 
 17.  See David Garland, Penal Modernism and Postmodernism, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL 45 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stan Cohen eds., 2003); see infra Part VII. 
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compounding the ambiguity inherent in the terminology.18 Other types of 
constraint may derive from elements in the criminal justice system or the 
sentencing process itself (“internal” constraints), or from political, cultural 
pressures or other societal developments (“external” constraints). The 
cumulative effect of these constraints is to raise doubts both as to the potential 
for the adoption of meaningful sentencing reforms and for achieving accuracy in 
their evaluation.  
The following sections of the article will examine some of these issues in the 
context of the two main sentencing paradigms19 that have guided reformers in 
the era of modern penology and been the subject of sentencing research—the 
positivist model and the “just deserts” model.20 Particular attention will be paid 
to conceptual and research issues that have a bearing on contemporary work in 
this field. This will be followed by some brief observations on the outcomes of 
the researchers’ evaluations and their ability to address the issues raised. Since 
one of the salient issues in sentencing has always been its severity, consideration 
will be given (if only briefly) to the relevance of the contemporary literature on 
penal punitiveness, its causes, and the potential for its control, in order to assess 
its relevance for an understanding of sentencing policy and its evaluation. In 
light of these analyses, the concluding section will consider how far the 
anecdote with which the article opened, while portraying what has come to be 
known as the issue of “transplants”21 or policy transfers,22 should be seen to 
exemplify the field of sentencing policy. This section will also consider possible 
theoretical frameworks for a better understanding of sentencing reform and the 
sentencing process in the contemporary world. 
 
 18.  The term “disparities” may connote differences that are unjustified, but for some writers this 
attribution will require addition of the epithet “unwarranted.” Cf. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, 
at 104–42. Similar ambiguity attaches to the term “extralegal variables,” given the uncertainty as to 
which variables will be perceived as legally relevant under the alternative paradigms. 
 19.  The different conceptual approaches to sentencing that have prevailed in different periods are 
variously—but not necessarily accurately—described in the penological literature as “schools,” 
“models,” “paradigms,” or “ideologies.” The term paradigm is helpful in the present context in 
connoting Kuhn’s account of the manner in which a particular approach may dominate academic 
thinking that may be slow to change even when faced with contradictory empirical evidence. On the 
other hand, Kuhn was more concerned with scientific explanations of the (natural or social) world, 
whereas sentencing “paradigms” (especially just deserts) may be more associated with policy and 
ideology. 
 20.  Less space will be devoted to Beccaria’s “classical” paradigm, since the sentencing practices 
advocated therein—notably deterrence—were not, at the time, the subject of empirical research. 
 21.  See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (1993). 
 22.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CULTURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIME CONTROL 3–7 (Tim Newburn & Richard Sparks eds., 2004). 
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III 
SENTENCING PARADIGMS 
I have referred to the myriad factors that may influence the sentencing 
decision. Sentencing, however, is a normative matter par excellence. Rather 
than being the product of a chance combination of variables, sentencing should 
be a reflection of the values and policies expressed in the legislation, 
precedents, or guidelines that form the sentencing framework. By implication, 
variables affecting sentencing will be legitimate if they give expression to the 
intended values and policies, but may cease to be so in the event of changes in 
the aims of sentencing. 
The status of the various sentencing aims is generally evident at any given 
time and place by virtue of the adherence of the dominant penological 
discourse to a particular sentencing paradigm. The modern history of penology 
and sentencing has been characterized by a succession of such paradigms, each 
with its own clear rationale and implications for sentencing policy. Beccaria’s 
paradigm, based on deterrence and the certainty and proportionality of 
punishment,23 represented the views of the eighteenth century enlightenment 
and the “classical school” of criminology. The second half of the nineteenth 
century produced the birth of the social sciences and the positivist school, with 
the new paradigm oriented towards treatment and the individualization of 
punishment.24 Following the critique of the abuses of excessive discretion 
inherent in this paradigm,25 with its potential for wide disparities in sentencing,26 
together with the alleged failure of rehabilitation as an achievable objective,27 
the individualization paradigm was in turn replaced by “just deserts.” Under 
this paradigm, punishment would once again be proportional to the seriousness 
of the offense, but now conceptually based on principles of retributivism rather 
than the deterrence ideology of the classical school. 
Such changes in the prevailing paradigm create problems for the researcher, 
since, as we move from paradigm to paradigm, the key concepts of the 
sentencing literature such as disparities, discrimination, and the differentiation 
between “legal” and “extralegal” variables will change their meaning.28 The 
adoption of a paradigm should, on the other hand, bring the benefits of clarity 
and consistency. Uniformity or consistency of sentencing based upon the type 
or seriousness of the offense would, under an individualized sentencing model, 
 
 23.  CESARE BECCARIA, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (J.A. Farrer ed., 1880). 
 24.  See RAYMOND SALEIILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT (1911). 
 25.  See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971). 
 26.  This was particularly the case in the United States. See MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL 
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972). On comparisons between the United States and Europe, 
see Ely Aharonson, Determinate Sentencing and American Exceptionalism: The Underpinnings and 
Effects of Cross-National Differences in the Regulation of Sentencing Discretion, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 1, 2013 at 161; see also infra Part VII. 
 27.  Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB. 
INTEREST 22, 49 (1974). 
 28.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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constitute a departure from the prevailing ideology, which links the sentence to 
the rehabilitative needs of the individual offender. Radically differentiated 
sentences for like offenses will, on the other hand, be entirely acceptable if the 
personal circumstances warrant it. 
Nevertheless, paradigms (as broadly conceived in the context of this 
article),29 although helpful for conceptualization, are no more than ideal-types, 
and specific policies and practices are likely to diverge from the prevailing 
paradigm. Competing paradigms may co-exist over long periods, and hybrid 
and compromise models may be adopted.30 Such mixed transformations, 
coupled with the instability of the meaning attributed to such expressions as 
disparity in sentencing, may cause confusion and hamper any attempt to 
evaluate the effects of a reform. 
A further dimension may be added if a sentencing paradigm based on 
deontological aims is replaced by a consequentialist scheme or vice versa. To 
evaluate a consequentialist sentencing aim, it will be necessary not only to 
examine the decision-making practices of the courts, but also the subsequent 
conduct of the convicted offender (as well as of law enforcement personnel) if 
the purpose is rehabilitation or individual deterrence, or of the general public if 
the objective is general deterrence—with the potential for an exponential 
increase in the complexity of the research. However, although operating within 
the positivist paradigm, the first significant group of sentencing researchers was 
more modest in its objectives and focused on judicial decision-making. 
IV 
THE POSITIVIST PARADIGM 
Positivism in criminology may be identified by some with etiological 
theories based upon born criminality and stigmata,31 and with a penal system 
characterized by the indeterminate sentence, uncontrolled discretion, and the 
failed treatments and injustices exposed in such works as The Struggle for 
Punishment.32 However, positivism also heralded the birth of criminological and 
other societal research purporting to invoke “scientific” methods and to seek 
the incorporation of research findings into social policy. Although the “just 
deserts” paradigm in sentencing, which gave rise to the policies on which the 
present symposium is focused, is perceived as anti-positivist from a 
criminological perspective,33 positivist methodologies continue to guide much of 
the accompanying research. 
 
 29.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 30.  Cf. TED BENTON & IAN CRAIB, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 58–63 (2d ed. 2010). 
 31.  RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & RONET BACHMAN, EXPLAINING CRIMINALS AND CRIME 47 
(2001). 
 32.  See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 25; THOMAS BLOMBERG & 
KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY 66–68 (2000). 
 33.  See Roger Hood, Penal Policy and Criminological Challenges in the New Millenium, 34 AUSTL. 
& N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2001). A legal perspective may lead to a different conclusion, since desert 
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The positivist school believed that the punishment should be determined by 
the needs of the individual offender rather than by the seriousness of the 
offense. However, while academic and policy discourses underwent substantial 
transformations with the rise of positivism at the onset of the twentieth century, 
practices were almost certainly slower to do so and, more particularly, remained 
more diverse. Moreover, outside the United States the influence of the 
individualized sentencing paradigm seems to have been more marginal to actual 
sentencing practice. While Raymond Saleilles was preparing his seminal 
manuscript on The Individualization of Punishment in the 1890s,34 publications 
appearing in Britain were more concerned with disparities in the sentences 
imposed for the same offenses35—suggesting adherence to a more traditional 
paradigm. 
The individualization of punishment was further promoted at the sentencing 
level at the turn of the century by the adoption of such reforms as the invention 
of the juvenile court,36 the concept of the pre-sentence report with its implicitly 
clinical overtones—and the emergence of the professional role of the probation 
officers.37 In Europe, the ideological orientation towards individualized 
sentences was strengthened by the developing school of social defense,38 with its 
focus on the perpetrator’s dangerousness as a basis for the sentence, and the 
emergent laws for habitual, recidivist, and, later, psychopathic offenders—
paralleling similar developments in the United States.39 Under the European 
penal system, however, the individualization principle seems not to have eroded 
underlying classical principles. 
These tensions may be detected in the early empirical research on 
sentencing. Empirical research was one of the defining characteristics of the 
positivist movement, and was perhaps inspired by a seminal article published by 
Everson in 1919,40 followed by a series of publications by Gaudet and his 
colleagues.41 A number of studies were conducted around mid-century—
 
sentencing dictates that the court abides closely by the legal code. Cf. Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, 
Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/. 
 34.  SALEIILLES, supra note 24. 
 35.  LEON RADZINOWICZ & ROGER HOOD, THE EMERGENCE OF PENAL POLICY IN VICTORIAN 
AND EDWARDIAN ENGLAND 741 n.2 (1990) (quoting Anon, The Way of Escape by Death, 976 
WHITEHALL REV. 5–6 (1895)). 
 36.  The first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899. See BLOMBERG & 
LUCKEN, supra note 32, at 83–98. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See generally MARC ANCEL, SOCIAL DEFENCE (1966). 
 39.  See generally YSABEL F. RENNIE, THE SEARCH FOR CRIMINAL MAN: A CONCEPTUAL 
HISTORY OF THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER (1978). 
 40.  George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 
(1919). 
 41.  See, e.g., Frederick J. Gaudet, George. S. Harris, & Charles W. St. John, Individual Differences 
in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933). 
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facilitated at this time by the gradual emergence of more sophisticated 
methodologies, including multivariate analysis and the use of significance tests.42 
Among these studies was Shoham’s empirical study of the sentencing 
objectives of Israel’s district court judges and of the extent of the disparities in 
their sentencing practice.43 Other studies, each with its distinctive orientation, 
were conducted at this time by Edward Green in the United States, Roger 
Hood in Britain and, a few years later, by John Hogarth in Canada.44 Seeing 
that, by and large, the positivist penology of this period favored a sentencing 
process that was oriented towards the personality and circumstances of the 
offender and was opposed to a formalist sentencing philosophy focusing on the 
seriousness of the offense, it is of interest to consider why these scholars should 
have been so concerned with sentencing disparity: disparities might have been 
perceived as an inseparable component of the prevailing rehabilitation model. 
A perusal of the research publications at the time suggests that the driving 
force for these studies was fascination with the judicial personality and its likely 
effect on sentencing outcomes. One factor was the influence of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, which led to speculation as to the unconscious drive motivating 
judges to punitiveness, as reflected in such works as Alexander and Staub’s The 
Criminal, the Judge and the Public and Weihofen’s The Urge to Punish.45 There 
was also a growing interest in the work of social psychologists on the impact of 
social attitudes on public (including legal) policy;46 this was reflected in the 
American realist movement, particularly in the work of Glendon Schubert on 
“jurimetrics.”47 These influences were felt in the sentencing studies referred to 
here. 
While the rehabilitation ideology required that the courts have wide 
discretion in their sentencing decisions, the intention was that the choice of 
sentence would accord with the characteristics of the individual offender, and 
not with the personality of the individual judge. Thus, while the concern with 
disparities is today identified with desert-oriented scholarship, it seems that it 
was also a concern for these positivist scholars. Unlike the reformers of the 
1970s, however, the literature drawing attention to judicial disparities during 
the earlier period seems to have been less acutely concerned with issues 
 
 42.  See, e.g., EDWARD GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING 26–28 (1961). 
 43.  Shlomo Shoham, The Sentencing Policy of Criminal Courts in Israel, 50 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 327 (1959). 
 44.  See GREEN, supra note 42; ROGER HOOD, SENTENCING IN MAGISTRATES’ COURTS: A 
STUDY IN VARIATIONS OF POLICY (1962); JOHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 
(1971). The first of these studies focused on the individual judges in an urban criminal court, the last 
two on the variations among magistrates’ courts in widely differing geographical areas. For a review of 
earlier studies, see HOGARTH, supra, at 1. 
 45.  FRANZ ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC (1956); 
HENRY WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956). 
 46.  The earlier study by GAUDET ET AL., supra note 41, seems to have been motivated by 
curiosity with regard to individual differences among judges, which in turn was inspired by a study of 
exam-marking in an educational setting. 
 47.  See GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED (1974). 
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pertaining to justice and rights48—rights consciousness (and the related civil 
rights movement) only having begun to emerge as a powerful movement 
somewhat after the period in question. Researchers in the earlier period were 
rather concerned that the sentence should reflect a “scientific” process, related 
to the characteristics of the offender—although also aware of the relevance of 
the “legal” offense-related variables. It will be instructive to examine these 
studies from this perspective. 
The seminal study by Gaudet et alia,49 which seems to have inspired many of 
the later studies, was originally titled “A Study of Some Factors Other than 
Guilt and Nature of Offense Which Determine the Length of a Prisoner’s 
Sentence.”50 The article lists these factors that, in addition to judge-related 
variables, include the prisoner’s “marital condition, his color, his race, his 
political affiliations . . . the age of the prisoner, his religion, general business 
conditions, etc.”51 It might be anticipated that many of these factors would, like 
the judge-related factors, be perceived by the authors as non-legitimate 
considerations at sentencing. However, later in the article the authors refer to 
the judge-related variables as relevant to the question of whether differences in 
sentencing tendencies “are to be found outside of the crime and those of the 
offender.”52 This formulation seems to imply that this open-ended list of 
offender-related variables, like the crime-related ones53—but unlike those that 
were judge-related—was seen to play a legitimate role in the sentencing 
decision. 
Hood’s study was mainly aimed at describing sentencing patterns by area in 
order to determine how far variations are accounted for by geographical 
influences, in addition to those factors that might normally be expected to 
influence the sentence. The latter category then had to be identified for the 
purposes of the study (that is to say, for control purposes). This issue was 
addressed by Hermann Mannheim in his introduction: 
For technical reasons, not every conceivable factor potentially affecting magisterial 
policy can possibly be examined, but there are a number of them which by common 
experience form the basis of sentencing, such as the seriousness of the offence, the 
number and kind of previous convictions, work habits, age, marital status, and the 
like.
54
 
 
 48.  But see infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing  Hood’s concern with “equality of 
consideration”). 
 49.  Gaudet et al., supra note 41. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 813 (emphasis added). 
 53.  A positivist purist might of course argue that crime-related variables should also be irrelevant 
to sentencing except insofar as they reflected upon the offender’s personality. See, e.g., FILIPPO 
GRAMATICA, PRINCIPES DE DEFENSE SOCIALE (1963); BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST (2d ed. 1981). But most 
criminologists probably accepted the “neo-classical” compromise. Cf. SHLOMO SHOHAM, OFFENCES 
AND PUNISHMENTS IN ISRAEL 14 (1963) (in Hebrew). 
 54.  Hermann Mannheim, Introduction to HOOD, supra note 44, at xv. 
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It will be noted that the list includes offender-related variables such as work 
habits, age, and marital status—and that Mannheim’s formulation suggests, 
again, that the consideration of these variables in the sentencing decision was 
legitimate. Hood’s own list of variables to be taken into account also included 
“occupation.”55 He then elaborated the principle of “equality of consideration,” 
implying that all such variables could legitimately be taken into consideration as 
long as the courts behaved consistently in this respect. He was particularly 
concerned as to whether courts were using imprisonment for the same “type” of 
offender.56 
Edward Green, in the introduction to his study of sentencing practices in 
Philadelphia, devotes one section of this chapter to the criteria for sentencing.57 
These are divided into three categories. The first is entitled “statutory criteria” 
and focuses on the provisions of the law. Here he posits that “the law requires 
that the punishment fit the crime,” while adding that “the standards of 
measurement are vague.”58 His third category is titled “legally irrelevant 
criteria.” Here he refers not only to the personality of the judge but also to 
“political or journalistic pressures, public hysteria, [and] prejudice against 
minority groups.”59 Of particular interest in the present context, however, is his 
second category, which he calls “discretionary criteria.” Here he asserts that 
“the standards available to the judge for determining the penalty in a given case 
emanate from the ethical and moral order of which the law is a part.”60 These 
standards “pertain to the circumstances of the criminal act, the characteristics of 
the offender, and the attitudes and sentiments of the community towards 
certain types of crimes or criminals.”61 
Thus, despite Green’s earlier declaration in relation to the punishment 
fitting the crime, offender-related and community-related criteria are also 
perceived as a part of the sentencing equation. For the purposes of elaborating 
the meaning of “offender-related criteria,” Green cites—apparently with 
approval—an article by Judge Theodore Levin, which addresses various 
utilitarian considerations relating to the likely effects of different sanctions on 
the offender in question, and asks, “Are the offender’s emotional and mental 
characteristics, his family ties, and his business interests such as to offer 
encouragement and hope for his reformation . . . ?”62 Once again, we see here a 
very open-ended (and some would say problematic) account of the variables 
designated as relevant; in spite of Green’s apparently clear-cut threefold 
 
 55.  Id. at 15. 
 56.  Id. at 16. 
 57.  GREEN, supra note 42, at 3–20. 
 58.  Id. at 4. 
 59.  Id. at 6. 
 60.  Id. at 5. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. (quoting Judge Theodore Levin, Sentencing the Criminal Offender, 13 FED. PROBATION 3, 
3–4 (1949). 
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categorization of sentencing variables, any attempt to develop a structured 
sentencing process based upon this analysis would be fraught with difficulty. 
Shoham’s account of the criteria invoked in the sentencing decision was 
similar, but less open-ended. In his 1959 article he, too, adopted a three-fold 
category for analyzing these criteria: (1) the offense and its circumstances, (2) 
the offender and his background, and (3) the attitude of the trial judge.63  The 
second category includes “the offender’s economic means and position, his 
family, age, social background, physical and mental health,” as well as his 
criminal record.  The article referred to by Shoham makes no judgment as to 
the legitimacy of these variables as determinants of the sentence. Even in his 
conclusion, where he refers to the variations among judges that cannot be 
explained by offense and offender differences, he leaves open the question of 
the “penal or social consequences of these variations” and “to what extent they 
are remediable.”64 However, it is clear from other parts of his article that 
Shoham attributes overriding importance to offender-related considerations.65 
It has surely become clear that the somewhat vague and open-ended lists of 
variables—particularly offender-related variables, which were apparently 
perceived by Shoham and his contemporaries as legitimately influencing the 
sentencing decision—would present a serious obstacle in any attempt to 
introduce a rigid system of structured sentencing, which was not a priority 
among these researchers. Even the influence of the identity of the judge on the 
sentence, while an object of special fascination to these researchers, seems to 
have attracted no more than implicit reservations, if at all. 
The “last word” in this line of research studies was surely the wide-ranging 
and meticulous study by Hogarth of magistrates in Ontario.66 Conducted a few 
years after the other studies mentioned, this study went far beyond its 
predecessors in the comprehensiveness and sophistication of its analysis, 
employing a range of multivariate analyses.67 Moreover, rather than deducing 
the personality differences among his sample from the differences in their 
sentencing practices, he studied the attitudes of the magistrates (both in terms 
of penal philosophy and other matters) directly, by interviews and attitude 
questionnaires.68 Hogarth found that most of the considerable variation in their 
sentencing practices could be explained by their personality and attitude 
differences.69 Information relating to the magistrates’ attitudes increased a 
researcher’s power to predict the outcome of a case five- or six-fold.70 
Sentencing should be seen not as a “black box” that simply translates input 
 
 63.  Shoham, supra note 43. 
 64.  Id. at 337. 
 65.  Id. at 331. 
 66.  HOGARTH, supra note 44. 
 67.  Id. at 15–33. 
 68.  Id. at 27, 103–37. 
 69.  Id. at 47–165. 
 70.  Id. at 382. 
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variables into appropriate decisions, but rather as a lively interactive locus for 
the processing of information in accordance with the magistrate’s personality. 
The value-free language of Hogarth’s study is striking. Hogarth expressed 
no views of his own on the purposes of sentencing, which he believed to be 
beyond the parameters of his study (he found that the dominating purpose of 
sentencing among the magistrates at that time was reformative),71 but he did 
conclude that outcomes deriving from the personalities of individual 
magistrates were “likely to be repugnant to the average man’s sense of 
justice.”72 
A remarkable feature of these studies from a contemporary perspective—
particularly striking in relation to Hogarth’s because of its general 
comprehensiveness—is the relative lack of interest in socio-demographic 
variables,73 particularly race. Nonetheless, a review of the evidence regarding 
the role of “non-legal variables” published in 1974 by John Hagan was able to 
locate twenty studies from the preceding decades (all from the United States) in 
which data were presented on these topics.74 
The somewhat marginal status of court sentencing research at this time may 
be explained by the fact that there was almost certainly less interest in judicial 
sentencing patterns than in the impact of sentences, both on the offenders on 
whom they were imposed (rehabilitation, individual deterrence, and 
incapacitation) and on other potential offenders (general deterrence). The 
methodologies for such evaluations were continually improving, with the fifty 
U.S. states constituting a natural laboratory for cross-jurisdiction comparisons. 
The accumulation of research findings on the effects of offender 
interventions led to “systematic reviews,” notably by Martinson and his 
colleagues.75 The disappointing evidence that emerged from the research fed 
into the increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional paradigm as reflected in 
the publications of the 1970s referred to above, emphasizing the arbitrariness 
and unpredictability of penal practices under this paradigm. As noted earlier, 
these perceptions contributed to the acceptance of the new paradigm of just 
deserts, to be based upon structured and proportionate sentencing, and 
epitomized by the establishment of sentencing commissions and the 
introduction of sentencing guidelines. 
 
 71.  Id. at 73, 288–91. 
 72.  Id. at 386. 
 73.  Green’s study, however, was included in Hagan, infra note 74. 
 74.  John Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological 
Viewpoint, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 357, 358 (1974). The study can be seen as a pioneering exercise in 
meta-analysis in that Hagan re-analyzed the findings of many of the studies he reviewed. On the other 
hand, the fact that he found the need to explain somewhat basic statistical interpretations to the 
readership (such as the difference between statistical significance and the magnitude of the association) 
suggests that familiarity with such methodology was limited at this time. 
 75.  See Martinson, supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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V 
THE JUST DESERTS PARADIGM AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The new paradigm generated statutory and policy reforms across the United 
States, as well as other, mainly common law jurisdictions, and was accompanied 
by a vast academic literature. More particularly, in addition to the extensive 
policy debates,76 the reforms have inspired new waves of empirical research.77 In 
the wake of the disillusion with the consequentialist achievements of the 
correctional system under the “outgoing” rehabilitation-oriented paradigm, the 
dependent variable on which researchers were now focused was the sentence of 
the court rather than its social outcomes78—in principle a much simpler research 
objective. Interest has focused on such issues as whether the elimination of 
disparities has been hampered by such institutional obstacles as prosecutorial 
discretion.79 The present article, however, focuses on a number of conceptual 
issues that may have given rise to uncertainties or constrained the 
implementation of the reforms, thereby impeding their evaluation. 
A.  Process of Reform and its Rationale 
Evaluation of the success of any penal reform requires an understanding of 
its purposes or rationale, a point that arose in the context of the anecdote 
presented at the beginning of this paper. Identification of the rationale may not 
seem to be a major problem in the context of the adoption of the just deserts 
paradigm and structured sentencing in the United States in the 1970s, the main 
aim of which seems to have been the reduction of judicial discretion in order to 
reduce disparities among judges. However, beyond the concern with disparities 
in general, there was also specific concern regarding discrimination against 
minorities, as well as some class and gender concerns. Moreover, some 
proponents of these reforms may have had expectations regarding the severity 
of the sentences—whether an increase or a decrease.80 
This leads to the question as to how “the purposes” of a penal (or other 
legal) reform may be identified. The literature of jurisprudence alludes to the 
varied traditions of different legal systems with regard to the interpretation of 
 
 76.  See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, OVERCROWDED TIMES (1989–2000); STITH & CABRANES, supra 
note 12; Symposium, Sentencing: What’s at Stake for the States?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 933–1416 (2005). 
 77.  See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? (2d ed., 2009); The Symposium on Crime 
and Justice: The Past and Future of Empirical Sentencing Research, UNIVERSITY OF ALBANY SCHOOL 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2010), http://www.albany.edu/scj/symposium_home.php. For an early attempt 
of a comprehensive multi-disciplinary evaluation, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH ON 
SENTENCING: SEARCH FOR REFORM 1 (1983). 
 78.  Research on the consequentialist objectives of sentencing did not cease entirely, of course, and 
was subsequently encouraged by the movement towards “evidence-based” policies. See, e.g., DORIS 
MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS? (2006). 
 79.  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, 130–42; see also Aharonson,  supra note 26. 
 80.  This question has been prominent in the context of the recent Israeli reform, owing to 
conflicting indications by Ministry of Justice personnel in this regard, which served to enhance 
opposition to its adoption among liberals. 
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legislation, focusing on the legislative texts, preambles and travaux 
préparatoires.81 This task was realistic in an era when law reform was primarily a 
matter of government initiatives based on the advice of “experts,” and the 
reports of public and professional committees (characteristics of the positivist 
era considered in the previous section), and when societies were culturally more 
homogeneous. Today, legislation in many societies rather reflects the activities 
and initiatives of individual parliamentarians (especially if introduced as private 
members’ bills), the media, and innumerable interest groups, NGOs, moral 
entrepreneurs, and other components of civil society.82 Legislation might also be 
the product of a political deal.83 These phenomena may render identification of 
the rationale even more problematic. 
B.  Sentencing Philosophy 
While the sentencing philosophy incorporated in the reform will inevitably 
be related to the reform’s rationale, the former is more likely to be specified 
explicitly in the legislation—or the sentencing guidelines, if any. Such reference 
to specific sentencing purposes does not, however, ensure clarity and the purity 
of a particular sentencing paradigm. 
As indicated above, academic tradition identifies the contemporary 
structured sentencing movement with a retributivist or desert philosophy—
more specifically the “just deserts” model as espoused in Doing Justice and the 
other writings of Andrew von Hirsch.84 This view, however, has by no means 
been universally accepted by policy-makers. Notoriously, the U.S. Congress’s 
enabling statute saw sentencing guidelines as being consistent with all the 
traditional aims of sentencing.85 Another approach has been to adopt “limiting 
retributivism” as the guiding philosophy,86 which, in effect, also opens the door 
to a variety of consequentialist aims.87 The English model of structured 
sentencing adopted in 1991 (since amended) and the Israeli model have 
 
 81.  See, e.g., Jerry L. Marshaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal 
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV 827 (1991). 
 82.  For studies illustrating two contrasting legislative processes (although both oriented towards 
victims), see CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA-BARGAINING (1993); PAUL ROCK, HELPING 
VICTIMS OF CRIME (1990). AHARONSON, supra note 26, argues that the more populist characteristics 
referred to here and other features of “direct democracy” are what distinguish U.S. legislative 
processes from those of Europe. 
 83.  In a sense this is true of the federal sentencing reform of 1984, which was adopted as a result of 
an informal coalition between supporters of reform from among both Democrats and Republicans. See 
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, 33–77. 
 84.   See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR 
FUTURE CRIMES (1985). 
 85.  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 48–59. 
 86.  Richard Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 (Michael Tonry 
ed., 2004). 
 87.  Limiting retributivism sets the upper (and some would say lower) limits for the sanction 
according to desert principles, but subject to these limits consequentialist aims may be applied in 
determining the sentence. 
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attempted to structure the relationship as among the various aims.88 However, 
the multiplicity of aims under the federal model, the adoption of a hybrid 
model, or the superimposition of extraneous sentencing norms such as “Three 
Strikes” legislation may further impede the possibility of evaluating the extent 
to which the implementation of the reform has been successful. 
C.  Desert and the Components of Offense Seriousness 
Even desert purists, who would link the sentence exclusively with offense 
seriousness—defined as comprising harm and culpability89—are not in 
agreement as to the precise identity of these components. The relevance of 
various surrounding circumstances remains in dispute.90 Particularly 
controversial has been the degree of relevance of the offender’s prior record.91 
Clarity on the question of the relevance of such variables is critical to evaluative 
research, because variance in sentencing patterns will only be designated as 
sentencing “disparity” where it is attributable to factors held to be normatively 
irrelevant. Even under a desert-oriented scheme (ostensibly focusing 
exclusively on the seriousness of the offense) policy-makers may be tempted to 
take into account personal characteristics of the offender—for example via the 
“back door” of their linkage to culpability. Disadvantaged background may be 
a case in point.92 
Uncertainty with respect to the components of offense seriousness may 
hamper the attempt to assess the success of the law in giving rise to “just” 
sentencing. The problem is inevitably exacerbated where the reform 
additionally provides for the adoption of consequentialist rationales,93 even 
where restricted to special cases defined in the statutory norm, as under the 
English legislation of 1991 and the new Israeli law, since the criteria for opting 
for these rationales are somewhat open-ended, and rely upon assessments of 
future conduct.94 
 
 88.  See infra Part V.C. 
 89.  VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 79. 
 90.  See RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT, at 
xvii (1979) (“As the work itself demonstrates, there is no consensus among commensurate deserts 
theorists themselves on the implementation of the philosophy.”) 
 91.  See generally PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 
PERSPECTIVES (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). 
 92.  Cf. Barbara Hudson, Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and Difference, in FROM 
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 
189 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000). 
 93.  See supra Part V.B. 
 94.  The English law provided for non-commensurate sentencing on the grounds of preventing 
future serious harm by the offender. Criminal Justice Act, 1991, c.53 § 2(2)(b) (U.K.). Israel’s Penal 
Law now provides that the court may depart (downwards) from the range of “appropriate” sentences 
under section 40D where “the defendant has been rehabilitated or there is a real chance that he will be 
rehabilitated,” and (upwards) under section 40E “where there is a real fear that the offender will 
recidivate.” In the latter case there is a proviso that the upward departure should not substantially 
exceed the “appropriate sentencing range.” Even circumscribed by conditions, however, these criteria 
will remain vague. 
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D.  Severity of Punishment 
Under retributivist (or desert) theory, the punishment must be proportional 
to the crime, a principle reflected in much of the relevant jurisprudence, both 
domestic and international, although more rarely explicit in the relevant 
legislation.95 Retribution in sentencing, with its Kantian associations, connotes 
certainty, and—as indicated earlier—the main reason for the adoption of this 
paradigm was to provide clarity in sentencing. However, although the 
scholarship of penology and penal philosophy offers solutions to the question of 
“ordinal” proportionality (whereby the severity of the sentence will increase 
with the seriousness of the offense), as illustrated by the work of von Hirsch and 
Jareborg on “gauging seriousness,”96 satisfactory solutions have not been 
offered for determining the level of severity in absolute terms (“cardinal” 
severity).97 Although desert is a normative theory par excellence, it is not a 
unitary theory and is underpinned by a variety of theoretical rationales, such as 
censure and the “benefits and burden” theory.98 The few desert philosophers 
who have expressed views on the quantum issue offer diverse sentencing ranges, 
varying from the talionic99 to the very moderate penalty scale put forward by 
von Hirsch in Doing Justice,100 and reference to “community values” as the 
yardstick may aggravate the problem of determining the appropriate sentencing 
level rather than resolve it.101 Thus, no theoretically founded guidance has been 
available as to the appropriate level of the sentencing scale, and guideline 
commissions have to choose between using existing practice as their point of 
departure102 (“descriptive guidelines”), or somewhat arbitrary innovations 
(“prescriptive guidelines”). Similarly, a statutory provision exhorting the courts 
 
 95.  Richard Frase, Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy and Research, in SENTENCING 
AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 259 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds. 2001). Sweden 
is seen as an exception in this respect in specifying the principle and elaborating its components. See 
ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 4.  The recent Israeli reform, which adopts “appropriateness” as the 
underlying principle, follows a similar pattern. See Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 40B (1977) (Isr.). 
 96.  Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 
O.J.L.S. 1 (1991). 
 97.  See Leslie Sebba (with Iris Weinrib), Sentencing Severity in Search of a Theory, 3 HUKIM 99 
(2011) (Isr.). 
 98.  See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Apr. 14, 
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment. 
 99.  See, e.g., IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 79–81 (1997) (“On the question 
of the measure of punishment, retributivism entails the lex talionis [of Roman law]: as the offender has 
done, so it should be done to him.”). 
 100.  VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, supra note 84. 
 101.  See infra Part V.F. For possible techniques, see Andrew von Hirsch, Seriousness, Severity and 
the Living Standard, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 143 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth & 
Julian Roberts eds., 3d ed. 2009); David Indermaur, Dealing the Public In: Challenges for a Transparent 
and Accountable Sentencing Policy, in PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING COUNCILS AND SENTENCING 
POLICY 45 (Arie Freiberg & Karen Gelb eds. 2008). 
 102.  See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy 
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (2005). 
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to impose a proportionate or “appropriate” sentence103 is not easily given to 
evaluation in terms of “success.” 
E.  Sentencing Procedures and Extraneous Influences 
Sentencing research in common law countries has generally been reliant for 
its sources on records generated by the traditional role-players in the system —
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers—in accordance 
with standardized procedures. The structured character of the system gave rise 
to a sense of predictability as to the possible variables affecting the sentence.104 
It should be recalled, however, that the just deserts movement was 
accompanied or closely followed by the victims’ rights movement,105 and recent 
decades have increasingly recognized the victim’s right to input in the criminal 
process in adversarial systems, notably by means of victim-impact statements—
and in some U.S. jurisdictions, victim statements of opinion.106 The link between 
just deserts and victim-related considerations is not prima facie inconsistent, 
victim harm being a primary component of offense seriousness. However, the 
possible emotional overtones and vengeful or otherwise idiosyncratic views of 
victims may detract from the predictability of the sentencing outcome.107 
It is also widely believed that courts are influenced by media pressure, and 
what is presumed to reflect “public opinion.” Judges do not want to be viewed 
as “out of touch,” and their supposed need for “public trust” is sometimes 
incorporated into the formal legal norm.108 In cases of criminal victimization 
involving race, gender, class, or other topics of public interest, feelings may run 
high and pressure may be exerted. This may be enhanced by NGO or other civil 
society activity, which may in turn interact with the media or the victim. Such 
variables may impact sentencing decisions, but are unlikely to be taken into 
account by sentencing researchers. 
F.  Reference Groups 
Desert sentencing posits that the offender will receive his or her due: the 
sentence to be imposed is that which “fits the crime”—and that others would 
 
 103.  Cf. Frase, supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 104.  The procedures, however (and more particularly the rules of evidence), were much more 
flexible at sentencing than at the trial stage—an issue only partly addressed by recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 311 (2004). 
 105.  The First International Symposium on Victimology was held in 1973, precisely the period in 
which the key publications identified with the advent of the just deserts movement were appearing. 
 106.  See DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 625–67 (3d ed., 2010). 
 107.  Leslie Sebba, Sentencing and the Victim: The Aftermath of Payne, 3 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 
141 (1994). 
 108.  On the attempts by sentencing commissions and sentencing councils to take public opinion 
into account in norm-setting, see ARIE FREIBERG & KAREN GELB, PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING 
COUNCILS AND SENTENCING POLICY (2008). 
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receive in the same situation. It is this feature above all that distinguishes the 
just deserts model from the individualization model that preceded it.109 
But who are the “others” to whom this equalization principle applies?110 The 
interest of sentencing researchers in the extent to which sentencing practices 
reflect the values of the local community (thus by implication legitimizing 
within-jurisdiction geographical variation) dates back to the positivist tradition 
of the mid-twentieth century111 and continues to generate positive findings in 
contemporary sentencing research, as well as attracting support.112 Yet in a post-
modern world of identity politics and diverse cultures, even local communities 
may lack a Durkheimian consensus as to the degree of censure “deserved” for a 
particular offense. 
On the other hand, not only does desert theory, with its Kantian 
associations, seem to presuppose that there is a just (or “appropriate”)113 
sentence for every crime, but the development of international human rights 
norms, in particular the creation of international institutions for dispensing 
penal justice such as the International Criminal Court and the various ad hoc 
tribunals, indicates an orientation towards universally approved sanctions.114 
However, while liberal doctrine identified with the promotion of the just deserts 
model might support such an orientation, the practice of domestic penal 
systems reveals substantial variation in their levels of penality.115 
The next section will take a brief look at the research literature relating to 
the reforms generated under the just deserts paradigm and in the aftermath of 
the paradigm’s adoption, noting indications of interpretational or other 
problems deriving from the conceptual or methodological issues that have been 
raised here. 
 
 109.   But see R.A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (2005). Duff, although 
an adherent to desert philosophy, would allow the penalty to be negotiated in the individual case 
between judge, offender, and victim though a communicative process. 
 110.  The issue here is possible differentiation not among perpetrators, which was referred in Part 
V.C, supra, but among sanctioning agencies. 
 111.  Cf. HOOD, supra note 44. 
 112. See JOHN H. KRAMER & JEFFERY T. ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: LESSONS FROM 
PENNSYLVANIA (2009). 
 113.  Cf. supra note 94. 
 114.  While most of the relevant international human rights conventions deal only with penal 
excesses such as torture and inhumane or degrading punishment, The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Sept. 2, 1990) refers explicitly to proportionality. 
 115.  See infra Part VII; Aharonson, supra note 26. On the potential for increased universalization 
of sanctioning norms, see Frase, supra note 95; Leslie Sebba, Punitiveness in International Criminal 
Justice: Some Explorations, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNITIVITY 187 (Helmut Kury & 
Theodore Ferdinand eds., 2008). 
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VI 
RESEARCH FINDINGS—AMBIVALENCE AND AMBIGUITIES 
During the thirty-five years since the publication of Doing Justice in 1976,116 
more than twenty U.S. states—in addition to the federal system—have 
reformed their sentencing system by means of a “guideline” system,117 and some 
developments of this type have occurred outside the United States.118 
Sentencing commissions have been charged with conducting research (or have 
chosen to do so) in order to monitor the effects of the reforms. There have also 
been numerous evaluation initiatives by other agencies and academics. 
Clearly no serious attempt can be made in a few lines even to summarize the 
findings of these publications. However, the impression gleaned from the more 
comprehensive overviews, including such sources as Spohn,119 Kramer and 
Ulmer’s recent study of the sentencing reforms in Pennsylvania,120 and Michael 
Tonry’s well-known overview Sentencing Matters,121 is that scholars perceive the 
research findings to be equivocal as to the extent to which the reforms have 
achieved their objectives (hence ambiguities),122 while the researchers 
themselves seem to be ambivalent as to what can or should be done about it. 
Although some positive findings are reported—particularly in relation to the 
reforms in Minnesota and Pennsylvania—doubts generally remain, inter alia, as 
to the extent to which disparities and discrimination have been reduced,123 and 
to the extent to which the courts have taken into account “extralegal” variables. 
Differences by localities are also widely reported. 
More specifically, Spohn reports on a meta-analysis conducted by Mitchell 
in 2005, which “revealed that the amount of unwarranted disparity in 
sentencing had not changed appreciably since the 1970s”;124 and Tonry puts 
forward detailed arguments as to why the claims of sentencing commissions that 
they have succeeded in reducing disparity should be doubted. In her earlier 
publication, which focuses specifically on racial discrimination, Spohn 
concludes: 
The fact that racial discrimination persists despite these policy changes suggests that 
reformers may have had unrealistic expectations about the ability of the reforms to 
 
 116.  VON HIRSCH, supra note 84. 
 117.  See Frase,  supra note 102. Some states introduced such a system but subsequently repealed it. 
 118.  See Indermaur, supra note 101 . 
 119.  SPOHN, supra note 77; see also Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest 
for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, in 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES AND DECISIONS OF THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 427 (2000); Julian V. Roberts, Structured Sentencing Outside the United 
States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming). 
 120.  KRAMER & ULMER, supra note 112. 
 121.  MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996). 
 122.  Of course since it may not be clear what precisely were the objectives of the reform, the issues 
discussed (for example, elimination of discrimination) may rather reflect the agenda of the researcher. 
 123.  These doubts seemed to be shared by Aharonson, supra note 26, at 181. 
 124.  SPOHN, supra note 77, at 190. 
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alter the sentencing process and/or that the reforms themselves have not been 
implemented as intended.
125
 
All these authors question the failure of guidelines to take into account what 
they perceive to be relevant variables—thus questioning the concept of “legal” 
variables.126 Tonry claims that the just deserts approach fails “to ‘treat different 
cases differently.’”127 Kramer and Ulmer, too, believe that substantive (as 
distinct from formal) justice would be achieved by greater flexibility in the 
guidelines. Paternoster, however, claims in a recent article that guidelines do 
indeed reduce disparities and that relaxation of the mandatory force of the 
federal guidelines has been shown to have increased disparities—attributing 
arguments to the contrary to the antipathy of their advocates to the supposed 
punitiveness of guideline policies.128 
One can only speculate as to how far uncertainties regarding the outcome of 
the sentencing reforms derive from the complexities of sentencing research 
alluded to above, from unsatisfactory features attaching to the reforms in 
question, or from obstacles to implementation—such as resistance on the part 
of key role-players in the criminal justice system129 or of “court cultures.” It 
should be noted, however, that academic analysis has been devoted specifically 
to the impact on the research findings in this area of the methodology applied.130 
Finally, while it is undoubtedly true that since the change in the sentencing 
paradigm in the 1970s incarceration rates in the United States have dramatically 
increased, a widely-held view that this increase is attributable to the sentencing 
guidelines131 has been challenged.132 The causes of punitiveness and its 
relationship to sentencing policies will be further considered in the next section. 
VII 
PUNITIVENESS AND ITS CORRELATES 
Soaring rates of imprisonment in the United States (the “mass 
incarceration” phenomenon), coupled with the publication of “league tables” of 
 
 125.  SPOHN, supra note 119, at 427. 
 126.  Id. at 142. For further discussion of this topic, see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 127.  TONRY, supra note 121, at 14. 
 128.  Raymond Paternoster, Racial Disparity under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Pre- and Post-
Booker: Lessons Not Learned from Research on the Death Penalty, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
1063 (2011). 
 129.  With reference to the prosecution, see supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 130.  Weisburd, supra note 14; Belinda Rodgers McCarthy & Charles A. Lindquist, Ambiguity and 
Conflict in Sentencing Research: Partial Resolution Through Crime-Specific Analysis, 13 J. CRIM. JUST. 
155 (1985). 
 131.  It may be that this view is more widely held outside the United States. It has certainly fuelled 
the arguments of opponents. See Boaz Sangero, Who is Interested in More and Longer Prison 
Sentences? On the Penal Law (Amendment: Structuring of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing) Bill, 2005, 5 
ALEI MISHPAT 247 (2006) (Isr.); see also Oren Gazal-Ayal & Rutie Lazar, Anticipated Outcomes of 
Departure Sentences, 3 HUKIM 41 (2011) (Isr.). 
 132.  See Kevin Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by 
Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787 (2006). 
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prison populations per 100,000 population around the world,133 have provoked a 
strong interest among criminologists in identifying the roots of punitiveness and 
thus explaining the differences observed between nations and cultures. The 
debate has been further stimulated by the comparative analyses of Whitman, 
Cavadino and Dignan, and Lacey.134 While Whitman emphasized historico-
cultural factors, the other studies attributed considerable significance to the 
political economy of the nations compared. Under the typology of Cavadino 
and Dignan, the most punitive nations in their sample were those that had 
adopted neoliberal economies (the United States, England, South Africa, and 
New Zealand); in the middle were the “corporatist” states of western Europe; 
and the least punitive135 were the social democracies of Scandinavia. The 
connection between the economic regime and punitiveness has been explained 
in terms of the economic insecurities and other fears related to globalization 
and migration policies that are perceived as being more threatening in 
neoliberal societies where the welfare infrastructure is more tenuous; and 
politicians—with the assistance of the media—have been accused of 
manipulating the public’s concerns, thereby fostering the fear of victimization, 
suspicion of “the other,” and the need to be “tough on crime.”136 
This idea that punitiveness may be connected with a nation’s social, 
political, economic, or cultural patterns or orientations is of course not new. 
Durkheim’s thesis that societies would move from repressive to restitutive 
norms was further supplemented by his “Two Laws of Penal Evolution.”137 
Rusche and Kirchheimer explained the prevailing forms of punishment in terms 
of economic interests, while Elias—and to some extent Foucault—emphasized 
cultural characteristics.138 Tonry, however, who has written extensively on 
developments in penal policy, including “American exceptionalism,” attributes 
the punitiveness of the United States to the excessively populist character of its 
democratic institutions139—a thesis further developed in this symposium by Ely 
Aharonson.140 Examples of this are electoral primaries, the use of referenda, and 
the election of judges and prosecutors. These phenomena contrast with the 
modifying effects of the professional bureaucracies charged with policy-making 
in European governmental departments. Savelsberg emphasizes the role of the 
 
 133.  ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8th ed., 2009). 
 134.  See MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, PENAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
(2006); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (2008); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003). 
 135.  Less punitive still was Japan, but Japan was considered sui generis among the group and 
designated “oriental corporatist.” 
 136.  Cf. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001). 
 137.   For example, see ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW 68–72, 79–85 (1978) 
 138.  An in-depth analysis of some of these theories is found in DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT 
AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990). 
 139.  Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, in 36 CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007). 
 140.  Aharonson, supra note 26. 
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state in these societies in generating knowledge and determining priorities in 
this field,141 while Garland and Sparks note that the irrationality of penal 
policies in neoliberal states can be explained by the fact that crime and 
punishment have become too important to politicians for them to leave policy 
formation in this field to professionals (such as criminologists).142 
These analyses raise profound issues in relation to both the dynamics and 
substance of penal reform. While early positivist criminology was characterized 
by its deterministic approach to criminality and confidence that researching the 
causes would enable experts to prescribe the appropriate criminal justice 
policies, the literature on the origins of punitiveness suggests that in neoliberal 
countries today, criminal justice policy, of which sentencing policy must be 
considered an integral part,143  is itself increasingly determined by external or 
constraining forces over which the actors in the system have little influence. The 
control of criminal justice policy-making by the professional bureaucracy in 
these countries has declined; and its subjection to the vicissitudes of media-
sensitive politicians could surely be a contributing factor to the unpredictability 
of sentencing policies and their outcomes. 
VIII 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
This article opened with an account of a “legal transplant” or policy 
transfer, which served to illustrate the uncertainties that arise in the course of 
attempts to achieve penal reform—particularly sentencing reform, including 
uncertainties as to its objectives. The article then pursued the theme of 
uncertainties which arise in the course of research on sentencing—particularly 
when attempting to evaluate its reform. It focused on the obstacles deriving 
from the almost limitless number of variables potentially affecting the 
sentencing decision, which may frustrate the implementation of reforms as well 
as their evaluation. Uncertainties associated with the open-ended 
individualization of the sentencing model of the positivist era have been 
replaced, or perhaps supplemented, by new uncertainties accompanying the 
adoption of the just deserts paradigm and its aftermath. 
Analyses of the research findings derived from the evaluations of desert-
related reforms in the United States indicated at least ambivalence, if not 
dissatisfaction, with outcomes. The literature on punitiveness pointed to societal 
forces that may be impacting sentencing structures in unpredictable directions. 
This same literature, however, indicates that many of the characteristics of 
penality and penal reform referred to in this article may be socio-culturally or 
 
 141.  Joachim Savelsberg, Punitiveness in Cross-National Comparison: Toward a Historically and 
Institutionally Founded Multi-factorial Approach, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNITIVITY 
13 (Helmut Kury & Theodore Ferdinand eds., 2008). 
 142.  David Garland & Richard Sparks, Criminology, Social Theory, and the Challenge of Our 
Times, in CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY 1 (David Garland & Richard Sparks eds., 2000). 
 143.  On the autonomy of sentencing policies, see infra Part VIII.C. 
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politically determined, and pertain primarily to so-called neoliberal societies. 
Comparative materials from Germany and Scandinavia serve to add credence 
to this impression.144 
Given the problematic picture emerging from both historical and 
contemporary accounts of sentencing reform and sentencing research in the 
United States and other neoliberal countries, coupled with the complex patterns 
of national or cultural diversity, it may be appropriate to consider new 
theoretical frameworks (or revise old ones) in an endeavor to enhance our 
comprehension of current developments. By comparison with the proliferation 
of research on sentencing outcomes in recent years, there may be room for 
more theoretical writing on the sentencing process, as well as on the processes 
of sentencing reform. Some possible directions will be indicated. 
A.  Modeling the Dynamics of Sentencing Reform 
While there has been extensive literature on penal policy-making in recent 
years, particularly in the context of punitiveness and mass incarceration, there is 
nevertheless room for more systematic research that would focus on the manner 
in which reforms (and in the present context, sentencing reforms) emerge and 
are debated, identifying the respective roles of government departments, 
legislators, NGOs, the public, and the media. This appears to have been 
recognized in a recent article by Lynch that triggered a symposium in 
Criminology and Public Policy, in which she seeks a new theoretical framework 
in order to understand the relationship between the local and the national in 
mass incarceration.145 Lynch criticizes researchers for focusing on the outcome 
of policy changes “with little attention given to the conditions and contexts in 
which sentencing laws were devised or transformed.”146 
Systemic accounts of legislative reforms could be supplemented by the in-
depth ethnographic methodologies employed by Paul Rock when researching 
the emergence of victim policy in Canada and the United Kingdom in an earlier 
era.147 Insights emerging from such research could produce models that might 
improve our understanding of the dynamics of sentencing reforms and their 
related outcomes. 
B.  Sentencing Decision-Making Processes 
The debates on the structuring of sentencing may have diverted our 
attention from its core element—the decision-making process of the judge. This 
 
 144.  See Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sentencing in Germany: Explaining Long-term Stability in the 
Structure of Criminal Sanctions and Sentencing, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, no. 1, 2013 at 211; Tapio 
Lappi-Seppala, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 139, at 217. 
 145.  Mona Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale: Understanding and Remediating 
American Penal Indulgence, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y. 673 (2011). 
 146.  Id. at 677. 
 147.  ROCK, supra note 82; PAUL ROCK, A VIEW FROM THE SHADOWS (1986). 
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was the focus of the early studies under the individualization paradigm, when 
discretion was almost unlimited. Hogarth’s sophisticated analysis of the 
Canadian magistrates at that time gave rise to a model in which the key to 
predicting the outcome was an understanding of how the individual judge would 
interpret the facts of the case in the light of “the social system and other 
features of the external world.”148 The recent study by Kramer and Ulmer, on 
the other hand, focused on a variety of court-level, community-level, state-level 
and “society-wide” factors.149 As in the case of policy-making models, in an age 
of globalized media, the sentencing model must reflect an ever-widening 
spectrum of agencies with potential influence over the outcome. Hogath’s 
model, whereby it is the judge at the end of the day who will process the 
information, should be incorporated. Since many of the influences affecting the 
decision will not be reflected in the formalized sentencing structure, the 
tensions observed by Kramer and Ulmer between formal and informal 
rationality will come into play. Alternative processes for reaching a decision 
within the model developed could serve as a basis for research on the perceived 
legitimacy of different procedural options—as well as the decisional outcomes 
likely to follow therefrom. 
C.  Sentencing Autonomy 
The discourse on sentencing generally seems to regard the choices faced by 
sentencing policy as autonomous. The literature on punitiveness, however, 
points to a deterministic dynamic: if your nation has a neoliberal regime, or 
your state elects its judges, incarceration rates will increase. 
There are essentially two issues here. The first is whether sentencing 
patterns can change irrespective of other components of the criminal justice 
“system.”150 Opponents of sentencing guidelines claim that discretion “lost” to 
judges emerges elsewhere. The second is whether the criminal justice system is 
in itself a reflection of other socio-political indicators, as indicated above. 
Interdependence between sentencing and other institutions—whether part of 
the criminal justice system or otherwise—would certainly account for the failure 
of “transplants” when a legal institution is imported from a different type of 
legal or socio-political system. Teubner, on the other hand, perceives the failure 
of transplants as a natural concomitant of his belief that the law is an 
autopoietic system151—self-referential and normatively closed, but cognitively 
open to its environment. The differences in their social settings give rise to 
incompatibilities between legal systems such that legal transfers serve as “legal 
 
 148.  HOGARTH, supra note 44, at 343. 
 149.  See KRAMER & ULMER, supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 150.  The term “system” suggests it cannot—but the terminology has been challenged. See generally 
LUCIA ZEDNER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 20 (2004). 
 151.  GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993). The theory is biological in 
origin and was applied to social systems by Niklas Luhmann. 
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irritants” causing unpredictable changes in the recipient system.152 
The implications of this theory for sentencing reforms in a volatile political 
environment are unclear.153 Wandall adopted the above theoretical framework 
for a study of sentencing in Denmark in the belief that it was particularly suited 
to elucidating the rule-oriented sentencing reforms in contemporary legal 
systems, specifically citing guideline systems.154 Nevertheless, consistent with the 
cognitive openness of the theory, “court organization provides space for . . . 
courts [to] respond to local social and political pressures.”155 
Replication of the study in the United States and other settings may produce 
insights regarding such issues as the relative weighting of legally-specified 
variables versus other variables within the different systems, as well as the role 
of reforms. The qualitative methodology of such studies could prove 
particularly insightful. 
D.  Changing Paradigms or Postmodern Chaos? 
Insofar as the research considered earlier casts doubt on the ability of the 
desert model to reduce disparities in sentencing—might this give rise to a 
change in paradigm?156 A revival of interest in consequentialist objectives 
(especially rehabilitation) was noted earlier,157 although not necessarily as the 
basis of a new sentencing structure.158 Desert sentencing may be more 
threatened by the desire to enhance victims’ rights159 or the growing interest in 
restorative justice.160 
Given, however, the populist and somewhat arbitrary character of the penal 
policies taking place in some western countries (whether or not we choose, with 
Garland, to describe these features as late modernity),161 the likelihood of 
 
 152.  See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 15 (1998); see also Roger Cotterrell, Comparatists and 
Sociology, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIANS AND TRANSITIONS 131 (Pierre Legrand & 
R.J.C. Munday eds., 2003). 
 153.  It should be observed that insofar as the reform involves a borrowing (or transplanting), this 
has usually been from a legal system belonging to the same “family.” 
 154.  RASMUS H. WANDALL, DECISIONS TO IMPRISON: COURT DECISION-MAKING INSIDE AND 
OUTSIDE THE LAW 18 (2008). 
 155.  Id. at 17. 
 156.  The term paradigm is, again, used here loosely. Cf. supra note 19. However, the idea of 
changing the paradigm because of doubts arising from the accumulation of research findings is, of 
course, close to the Kuhnian application of this concept. 
 157.  See supra note 78. 
 158.  Research findings related to the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs are based on 
categories of offenders rather than individual pathologies and can largely be implemented within a 
structured sentencing scheme. 
 159.  See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness, 
eds., 2007). Restorative justice has been conceptually developed as an alternative to just deserts. See 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT: NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (1990). 
 161.  Gardland, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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cohesion around a new model that can be effectively translated into 
government policies seems unlikely, and the academic literature reviewed 
above relating to neoliberal regimes and the United States in particular surely 
indicates quite another direction. Garland and Sparks note that the pace of 
change renders our “long established research agendas . . . outmoded and 
irrelevant.”162 
The uncertainty and unpredictability that seem to characterize sentencing 
are qualities emphasized in chaos theory. According to Milovanovic “chaos 
theory has emerged as one of the key threads of postmodern analysis that 
fundamentally challenges the assumption of an orderly world.”163 However, 
“chaos should not . . . be seen as purely randomness and chance events: rather, 
‘what makes chaos confounding is the way measurement uncertainties 
expand.’”164 Classified as a mode of non-linear analysis pertaining to complex 
system science,165 chaos theory has been applied to a variety of legal and 
criminological contexts in the past two decades,166 including judicial decision-
making.167 While it may be difficult, on the one hand, to isolate this theory from 
its anchorage in the physical sciences or, on the other, to separate it from other 
related concepts pertaining to postmodernism, the hypothesis that “seemingly 
insignificant events can sometimes have a major impact on the long-term 
behavior of systems”168 is surely worth testing in the sentencing context. The 
idea that a minor detail could skew the outcome of a case would be the obverse 
of Sudnow’s well-known thesis whereby the processing of cases becomes 
standardized on the basis of a small number of significant variables.169 
In conclusion, it is suggested that, given the many imponderables of 
sentencing reform and sentencing research, the time may be ripe for sentencing 
scholars to take a “time out” for a period of stock-taking and the exploration of 
theoretical modeling, whether on the lines suggested or otherwise.170 
 
 162.  Garland & Sparks, supra note 142, at 21. 
 163.  Milavonovic, supra note 1, at vii. 
 164.  Id. (citing D. PEAK & M. FRAME, CHAOS UNDER CONTROL 158 (1994)). 
 165.  Jeffery T. Walker, Advancing Science and Research in Criminal Justice/Criminology: Complex 
Systems Theory and Non-Linear Analyses, 24 JUST. Q. 555, 557 (2007). 
 166.  Milovanovic, supra note 1, at viii. 
 167.  Caren Schulman, Chaos, Law and Critical Legal Studies: Mapping the Terrain, in CHAOS, 
CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 123 (Dragan Milovanovic ed., 1997). 
 168.  Glenn D. Walters, Crime and Chaos: Applying Nonlinear Dynamic Principles to Problems in 
Criminology, 43 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 134, 137(1999). 
 169.  David Sudnow, Normal Crimes, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255 (1965). 
 170.  For other possible theoretical frameworks see KRAMER & ULMER, supra note 112, who 
applied Weberian theory, and Ralph Henham, Problems of Theorizing Sentencing Research, 28 INT’L J. 
SOC. L. 15 (2000), who applied Giddens’ structuration theory. 
